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(Updated March 2012)
Iran produced 215 billion kWh gross in 2008 from over 31 GWe of plant, giving per capita consumption of about 2000 kWh/yr. 80% of its 2008 electricity was from gas and 16.5% from oil, both of which it has in abundance, and it get some from hydro when available.
Nuclear power developments
In 1957 a civil nuclear program was established under the US Atoms for Peace program.
In 1974 the Shah announced a target of 23,000 MWe of nuclear capacity to free up oil and gas for export. Preliminary agreements with Siemens KWU and Framatome for four nuclear power plants were signed.
In 1975 construction of two 1,200 MWe PWR units was started 18 km south of Bushehr on the Persian Gulf by Siemens KWU. The contract was actually signed in mid 1976 and some $3 billion paid. After the Islamic revolution, further payment was withheld and work was abandoned early in 1979 with unit 1 substantially complete and unit two about half complete. The plant was damaged by Iraqi air strikes in 1984-88.
At Darkhovin, close to the Iraq border, there were also two French 910 MWe units which in January 1979 had just started construction under a $2 billion October 1977 contract with Framatome. These were cancelled in April 1979, and their engineering components were retained in France, being built there as Gravelines C, units 5 & 6, which came on line in 1985. In 1992, the Islamic Republic of Iran signed an agreement with China to build two 300 MWe reactors at the Darkhovin site, similar to those at Qinshan in China and Chashma in Pakistan, but China withdrew before construction started.
In 1994, Russia's Minatom and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) agreed to complete unit 1 of Bushehr nuclear power plant with a VVER-1000 unit, using mostly the infrastructure already in place. However, this necessitated major changes, including fabrication of all the main reactor components in Russia under a construction contract with Atomstroyexport. This 1000 MWe (915 MWe net) plant, being constructed by Atomstroyexport, has had a succession of construction and start-up delays. All work has been under IAEA safeguards and operation will also be under safeguards.
After two years delay due to Iran's reluctance to agree to returning used fuel to Russia without being paid for it, two agreements were signed early in 2005 covering both supply of fresh fuel for the new Bushehr nuclear reactor and its return to Russia after use. The Russian agreement means that Iran's nuclear fuel supply is secured for the foreseeable future, removing any justification for enrichment locally.
Russia's Atomstroyexport by the end of January 2008 had delivered the 163 fuel assemblies for the initial core of Bushehr plus 17 reserve ones - 82 tonnes of fuel in total. The fuel is enriched 1.6% to 3.62% and is under full international safeguards. The Russian government had withheld supply as negotiations over Iran's uranium enrichment activities proceeded. As of September 2009 the reactor was reported to be 96% complete and testing had begun earlier in the year. Fuel loading was expected by October, with first power soon after, but further delays pushed this to 2010, then to 2011. Atomstroyexport delivered the first one-third core reload by air from TVEL in May 2011 - about 30 tonnes of fuel which will be needed in 2012.
The reactor was finally due to start up in February 2011 and to "reach first power" in April, and fuel had been loaded by the start of December. However, late in February before starting up it was found that a pump had failed and possibly shed metal particles into the primary cooling system, which could damage the fuel elements. The fuel therefore had to be unloaded, checked and cleaned, and any debris removed from the pressure vessel. The pump concerned was one supplied in the 1970s and was part of the old equipment required to be used under the terms of the Russian contract. Eventually the reactor started up on 8 May 2011, was grid connected early in September 2011, and is expected to enter commercial operation about April 2012. It was reported to be at 75% capacity in late March.
The preliminary agreement states that the first reactor of Bushehr nuclear power plant would be operated by a 50-50 Russian-Iranian joint venture during the one-year warranty period. In August 2010 it was agreed that this JV would operate the plant for up to three years before Atomstroyexport gradually withdrew. However, in September 2011 after grid connection, Rosatom said: "According to the Iranian legislation, only a national company can be an operator of the nuclear power plant", hence Russian specialists would be invited to work under a contract to be awarded by the Nuclear Power Production and Development Company of Iran (NPPD), with their numbers gradually reducing.
The anticipated 7 TWh/yr from the new reactor will free up about 1.6 million tonnes of oil (11 million barrels) or 1800 million cubic metres of gas per year, which can be exported for hard currency.
Nuclear power reactors
Despite high-profile and serious disagreements with IAEA over uranium enrichment, the IAEA continues full involvement with Iran on nuclear safety issues, focused on Bushehr.
The AEOI originally said that construction of unit 2 at Bushehr was to proceed and that feasibility studies for a further 5000 MWe had been ordered. However in December 2008 it announced that the next step would be two new 1000 MWe plants nearby, with Bushehr unit 2 shelved.
The Nuclear Power Production & Development Company of Iran (NPPD), closely associated with AEOI, had invited bids in 2007 to construct two large third-generation PWR nuclear reactors - 1000 to 1600 MWe each - near Bushehr, to come on line about 2016. It is not known whether any bids were received. The government has made proposals to Rosatom regarding building further reactors, and these were still being considered at the end of 2011. Russia had noted that intergovernmental agreements would need updating and refining.
In May 2007 the AEOI said it was planning to build an indigenous 360 MWe light water reactor at Darkhovin on the Karun River in Khuzestan province in the west, close to Iraq at the head of the Gulf. Two Framatome 950 MWe plants were about to be built here in 1970s, and two 300 MWe Chinese plants were planned in the 1990s. The head of NPPD denied that these new ones would use Chinese technology and in October 2008 announced that their design would begin shortly and be completed in six years. In 2011 AEOI said that it planned a 360 MWe plant there, and that its design was well underway. The IAEA has requested, but not been given, design information on this proposed plant.
Iran is tectonically active, and nuclear power plants there need to be designed and built accordingly with high seismic criteria.
Uranium enrichment
Iran has a major project developing uranium enrichment capability. This program is heavily censured by the UN, since no commercial purpose is evident.
The antecedents of this go back to 1974, when Iran loaned $1.18 billion to the French Atomic Energy Commission to build the multinational Eurodif enrichment plant at Tricastin, and it secured a 10% equity in the enterprise, entitling it to 10% of output. The loan was repaid with interest in 1991 but the plant has never delivered any enriched uranium to Iran since the new government in 1979 cancelled its agreements with Eurodif and ceased payments to it. But in 1991 Iran revived its nuclear power ambitions and demanded delivery of its share of uranium under original contract, but this was refused by France due to political sanctions then being in force. Iran views this refusal as proof of the unreliability of outside nuclear supplies and cites the Eurodif experience as the basis for achieving energy independence by developing all of the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle itself. The AEOI still holds the 10% share in Eurodif. The 10.8 million SWU plant operated by Areva started production in 1979 and is due to close soon after 2010.
In about 2000 Iran started building at Natanz, 80 km southeast of Qom, a sophisticated enrichment plant, which it declared to IAEA only after it was identified in 2002 by a dissident group. This is known as the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and is above ground, but also at Natanz a large underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) is being developed. Operations at the PFEP, FEP and the uranium conversion plant (UCF) are under international safeguards, though monitoring is constrained. To May 2010, environmental samples confirmed that both enrichment plants were operating as declared, FEP producing less than 5.0% enrichment. However, in February 2010 about 1950 kg of low-enriched uranium from FEP was taken to PFEP.
Natanz PFEP
At PFEP, two cascades have been designated for production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235, apparently for the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR), and the balance of the plant is designated for R&D.
One cascade enriches from 3.5% LEU to almost 20%, while the second one takes the tails from the first one and produces about 10% LEU with tails of less than 1% uranium. The enriched stream is fed into the first cascade. Over February 2010 to May 2011 some 574 kg of the 3.5% LEU from FEP was fed into one of these cascades, and 56.7 kg of 19.7% enriched uranium was produced. The IAEA earlier responded that the PFEP operations now " required a full revision of the previous safeguards approach". This was agreed in May 2010, including enhanced surveillance and checks. . On 23 June 2011 the head of AEOI said: "We have the ability to produce 5 kg (of 20% enriched uranium) each month, but we do not rush." He had earlier said that the TRR required 1.5 kg of fuel per month. In August 2011 he confirmed that Iran had more 20% LEU than it needed for the Tehran research reactor, and that “security measures required that the sensitive part of the facilities would be transferred to underground buildings” - evidently Fordow. The IAEA reported then that monthly production rates of 20 percent LEU had increased significantly, implying better performance of the two IR-1 cascades.
International concern regarding the surge of activity in enrichment to about 20% U-235 is based on the fact that in terms of SWU (energy) input this is about 90% of the way to weapons-grade material, and thus would require only a small and possibly clandestine plant to bridge the gap.
The PFEP at Natanz started operating in 2003, and by 2006 a 164-centrifuge IR-1 cascade had produced 3.6% enriched material. Two other cascades were being installed, IR-2 and IR-3, and a 10-machine IR-4 cascade followed by mid-2009. To mid-August 2009, about 140 kg of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) had been fed into various cascades of four types, producing uranium enriched to less than 5%. The IR-1 machine is the local version of Pakistan's P1 centrifuge design, and Iran is undertaking R&D on a variant of the more advanced P2 design. A few of these new design centrifuges designated IR-2, IR-3 and IR-4 are installed, with increased rates of enrichment being achieved. Over February to May 2010, Iran introduced 74 kg of UF6 into a 20-machine cascade of IR-4 centrifuges, a 20-machine cascade of IR-2 centrifuges and into single machines. These quantities of UF6 feed and the number of centrifuges involved were consistent with this being R&D work. However, in February 2012, 4.5 kg/month of 19.75% enriched material was being produced, making a total of 95.4 kg of this so far, using 886 kg of 3.5% LEU.
Natanz FEP
At the main underground FEP at Natanz, production hall A is being set up with eight units (A24-A28 initially, A21-A23 later), each of 18 cascades with 164 IR-1 centrifuges – total 2952 each unit. In August 2010 the IAEA reported that 8856 IR-1 centrifuges were installed, 3772 were operating, over 30.7 tonnes of UF6 had been fed into FEP, and 2803 kg of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (3.5% U-235) had been produced. The target capacity is said to be 54,000 centrifuges.In November 2011 there were 6208 centrifuges operating in 37 cascades, and another 2800 installed. The plant was then producing 145 kg LEU per month, operating at a rate of 4250 SWU/yr, less than earlier in the year. By early February 2012 a total of over 5400 kg of low-enriched UF6 had been produced, and the rate had increased in the past few months.
Fordow FFEP
In September 2009, after the fact was exposed internationally, Iran told the IAEA that it was building another enrichment plant at Fordow, about 20 km north of Qom, in an underground tunnel complex on a military base. This Fordow FFEP is designed to have 16 cascades of about 3000 centrifuges of IR-1 type and is reported to be under the control of AEOI. Evidently construction began in 2006, and it was expected to be operational in 2011. IAEA inspections showed three cascades of IR-1 centrifuges were installed to November 2011, two being complete 174-machine ones, with a fourth planned. Iran says FFEP will be used for production of 19.75% enriched uranium. It earlier said that Fordow will hold only 12 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges, plus R&D activities. In January 2012 the IAEA confirmed that the Fordow plant was producing uranium enriched up to 20%, using IR-1 centrifuges, with all material under safeguards, but the capacity for higher enrichment is not clear.
Progress and plans
Over 2009-10 the Iranian centrifuge program was set back by the Stuxnet computer virus which affected Iranian companies involved with the control systems for the IR-1 centrifuges. In late 2009 to early 2010 about 1000 centrifuges at FEP were decommissioned. This appears to have been due to Stuxnet affecting frequency converters and causing the motors to over-speed, destroying the units. The normal failure rate of the IR-1 centrifuges is reported as about 10% per year.
In June 2011, the head of the AEOI announced it was installing 164-machine cascades of advanced centrifuges at the previously hidden Fordow enrichment plant (FFEP), and would triple its output of 19.75% low enriched uranium (LEU) by the end of the year. This would position Iran to stockpile a large amount of 19.75% LEU more quickly in a facility better protected against military strikes. The IAEA report on the situation in August 2011 said that Iran had deployed one IR-1 cascade but no advanced centrifuges at the Fordow Plant.
By mid February 2012, a total of 95 kg of 20%-enriched uranium had been produced, including some at Fordow.
Uranium Resources and Mining
In the early 1980s Iran purchased 450 tonnes of uranium (531 t U3O8) from South Africa. Some 366 t of this was subsequently converted to UF6 at Esfahan. This is the main, or possibly the only, material being used in Iran's enrichment plants.
Iran has very small reported uranium resources, all in a high cost category, about one third as reasonably assured and two thirds as inferred resources. It is reported to have significant levels of molybdenum and other impurities which create difficulties in enrichment. AEOI is responsible for uranium mining and treatment.
There is some open cut and underground mine development at Saghand in the central desert region of Yazd province, and in June 2009 the IAEA reported "ore recovery activities" there. Resources of 900 tU at 0.055% U are quoted. The associated Ardakan mill about 75 km west of Saghand was expected to produce 50 t/yr of uranium oxide from early in 2009, but as of October 2010 was still under construction. AEOI quotes its nominal capacity from 2012 as 57 tU/yr. A further uranium mine in Yazd province is reported to be planned.
The main mining and milling is at Gchine or Gachin, near the port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. The ore is in surficial salt plugs at 0.20 %U grade. The Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant (BUPP) began production in 2006, and operations continue. Production capacity of 18 tU/yr is reported by AEOI in 2011. This is delivered to the conversion plant at Isfahan. In October 2010 the government announced "new reserves" there.
Other parts of fuel cycle, R&D
A uranium conversion plant (UCF) at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre has 200 t/yr capacity and started up in 2004. It is under IAEA safeguards and the IAEA reported that to February 2009 it had produced 366 tU as UF6, ie 541 tonnes of UF6.
The Teheran Nuclear Research Centre was established in 1967 by the AEOI. It has a US-supplied 5 MW pool-type research reactor which has operated since about 1967. The IAEA monitors the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR) and also a Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope production facility (MIX). Since being converted from 93% HEU about 1988 by Argentinian specialists, the TRR runs on 19.75% enriched uranium, and 116 kg of this was supplied from Argentina about 1993 - enough for 10-20 years depending on how the reactor is operated. This had nearly run out in 2009. It was earlier said that the presence of molybdenum in Iranian UF6 means that domestic supplies may be unsuitable at this level of enrichment, but this is unconfirmed.
In 2009 it seemed likely that Russia might provide some further uranium for TRR fuel blended down from 36% enriched material and fabricated in France, in exchange for an equivalent amount of Iran's (< 5%) enriched uranium from Natanz. This was rejected by Iran, which then tabled a revised version. At issue was the amount of Iran's uranium stockpile to be handed over at one time, and where this would occur. The international negotiators wanted to do this exchange in one large shipment, while Iran preferred several smaller swaps which maintained more of its overall holding for a longer period. In February 2010 the government ordered the AEOI to commence enriching Iranian uranium to 19.75%. It is not clear whether the Isfahan fuel fabrication plant can make fuel elements for TRR.
In May 2010, a deal with Brazil and Turkey was announced and submitted to the IAEA whereby Iran would ship 1200 kg of 3.5% enriched uranium to Turkey, and then receive 120 kg of 19.75% enriched uranium fuel elements for the TRR in return from the so-called Vienna Group, comprising the IAEA, USA, Russia and France.
The Nuclear Technology Center of Isfahan operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China. It is run by the AEOI.
Iran is also building a 40 MW heavy water-moderated "research" reactor at Arak fuelled by natural uranium. The IR-40 design is very similar to those used by India and Israel to make plutonium for nuclear weapons, and was apparently designed by Russia's NIKIET. Construction is under way and the incomplete plant was "inaugurated" in August 2006. In August 2009 it was about 63% complete, with the reactor vessel due to be installed in 2011. In July 2011 AEOI reported it as 75% complete. It is to replace the old Teheran reactor. Iran has said that it will be under IAEA safeguards, and has been subject to IAEA inspection during construction. A heavy water production plant has already been in operation at Arak, but the IAEA is denied access to it.
A fuel manufacturing plant has been constructed at Isfahan to serve the IR-40 reactor and possibly Bushehr and TRR. In May 2009 the IAEA noted that fuel rods were being produced and that an initial fuel assembly for IR-40 had been produced from these. A plant for making research reactor fuel plates for TRR is expected to be commissioned about the end of 2011.
In June 2010 the AEOI announced that it planned to build four new research reactors for production of medical isotopes, including a 20 MW one to replace TRR when its operational life finishes in 15 years. This plan would justify production of more 20%-enriched uranium at Natanz, which gives rise to international concern.
Non-proliferation
Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1974. It has signed the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA but has not ratified it.
All Iran's facilities, except the Kalaye plant and the Arak heavy water plant, were under IAEA safeguards as of mid 2003. Details are in the Director-General's report to the IAEA Board of 6 June and 9 September 2003, and subsequent reports such as those to 23 May and 15 November 2007 on IAEA web site.
Iran originally attracted world attention in 2002 when some previously undeclared nuclear facilities became the subject of IAEA inquiry. On investigation, the IAEA found inconsistencies in Iran's declarations to the Agency and raised questions as to whether Iran was in violation of its safeguards agreement, as a signatory of the NPT.
An IAEA report in November 2003 showed that Iran had, in a series of contraventions of its safeguards agreement over 22 years, systematically concealed its development of key techniques which are capable of use for nuclear weapons. In particular, that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation from used fuel were carried out on a laboratory scale. Iran admitted to the activities but said they were trivial.
In August 2005 the IAEA Board called upon Iran to suspend work associated with uranium enrichment. In March 2006 the IAEA referred the issue to the UN Security Council. However Iran has not backed off from its activities in developing uranium enrichment.
On 24 March 2007 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution imposing further sanctions on Iran and reaffirming that Iran must take the steps required by the IAEA Board, notably to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. The IAEA reported in May 2007 that Iran had ceased providing information required under the Additional Protocol.
The IAEA stated clearly in November 2007 and since that unless the Additional Protocol was ratified and in place it is not possible for the Agency to establish that undeclared nuclear materials and activities are absent. Its "knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing." Meanwhile enrichment continues, the existence of the underground and undeclared Qom plant has come to light, and hence a third UN Security Council resolution is likely.
The Iran situation has revived wider concerns about which countries should develop facilities with high proliferation significance - such as enrichment and reprocessing, even under safeguards if there is no evident economic rationale. At some point in the future, such a country could give three months notice of withdrawal from the NPT and reconfigure its facilities for weapons production. The USA asserts that Iran has been in fact developing just such a breakout capability.
This contention was supported in February 2010 when the government ordered the AEOI to commence enriching Iranian uranium to 19.75% for the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR), thereby significantly closing the gap between its normal low-enriched material and weapons-grade uranium. The 1950 kg of low-enriched uranium (< 5%) moved to PFEP would be enough for vastly more 19.75% enriched uranium than the TRR could conceivably use. In August 2011 the AEOI confirmed that Iran had more 20% LEU than it needed for the Tehran research reactor, and that “security measures required that the sensitive part of the facilities would be transferred to underground buildings” - evidently Fordow.
See also Nuclear Proliferation Case Studies paper.